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COMMENT
Jurisdictional Rules and Final Agency Action
When Congress creates a statutory cause of action, some required elements
of that cause of action may be considered "jurisdictional," while others may
not. The difference between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional requirements
is subtle but important. A jurisdictional element limits the power and authority
of the courts. If a litigant fails to satisfy a jurisdictional element of a cause of
action, the court lacks the statutory authority to hear the case and issue a
decision on the merits.' By contrast, nonjurisdictional elements have no
bearing on the authority of the courts. Even when a plaintiff fails to satisfy a
nonjurisdictional requirement, the court can still decide the case on the merits.
If the defendant decides not to address the plaintiffs failure to satisfy a
nonjurisdictional requirement, the court cannot dismiss the case sua sponte on
those grounds, so the plaintiff can still win the case.
The distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional requirements
has received significant attention in recent years, as the Supreme Court has
issued a series of rulings narrowing the scope of what courts can properly
consider jurisdictional.' Nonetheless, despite the Court's recent decisions
narrowing the set of rules that qualify as jurisdictional, a number of lower
federal courts continue to embrace the jurisdictional label, even absent clear
statutory authorization. This Comment explores that phenomenon by
evaluating recent doctrinal developments with respect to one salient legal rule
in particular: the final agency action requirement in administrative law. Final
agency action is the unusual statutory requirement that affects judicial review
across a wide range of substantive issues and cases. That requirement, codified
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), plays an important role in
administrative-law litigation.'
1. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 16o-6i, 170-71 (2010).
2. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of "Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings," 105 Nw. U. L.
REV. 947, 947 (2011).
3. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 5 704 (2012) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
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Part I of this Comment explores the importance of jurisdictional treatment
for courts and litigants. Erroneous jurisdictional treatment can jeopardize
litigants' access to the courts and tilt the playing field in the government's
favor. Part II then argues that the lower courts' treatment of the final agency
action requirement is out of sync with the Supreme Court's decisions clarifying
the proper scope of the jurisdictional label. In some cases, the lower courts
engage with the underlying statute and simply come to the wrong result as a
matter of statutory interpretation; in other cases, the courts ignore the statute
altogether, using jurisdictional treatment as a mechanism for managing their
rising caseloads and preventing premature judicial intervention. Part III
explores how courts and Congress might recalibrate their treatment of final
agency action to resolve the existing doctrinal discord. The Comment
concludes by explaining that the tension between the lower courts' application
of the jurisdictional label and the Court's doctrine on jurisdictional treatment
appears to extend far beyond final agency action.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL TREATMENT
In recent years, the Supreme Court has paid significant attention to the
boundary between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules. Arguably the
most important decision in this line of cases is Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,' where
the Court announced the doctrinal test that distinguishes jurisdictional from
nonjurisdictional rules: Congress must "clearly state[] that a threshold
limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional" in order for courts
to treat the limitation as such.s Since Arbaugh, the Court has applied this clear
statement rule in a number of cases reversing lower-court decisions and
narrowing the application of the jurisdictional label.6 To be sure, the Court has
acknowledged that Congress need not "incant magic words in order to speak
clearly"' and that "context, including this Court's interpretation of similar
provisions in many years past, is relevant" to whether Congress has spoken
with sufficient clarity to warrant jurisdictional treatment. As a result, the
application of the clear statement rule sometimes can be more art than science.'
review."); Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983). The APA, however, is not a
jurisdictional statute. See infra Section II.A.
4. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
s. Id. at 515.
6. For a discussion of some of these cases, see Wasserman, supra note 2.
7. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013).
8. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2oo).
9. For an example of a statute that does speak clearly, see infra note 37 and accompanying text,
which discuss 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2012).
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Nonetheless, these cases have a clear message: judges must train their focus,
first and foremost, on the statutory text. Lower courts do not have discretion to
apply the jurisdictional label without statutory authorization from Congress.
The distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules has
captured the Court's attention in recent years partly because of the significant
consequences jurisdictional treatment carries for litigants. First, when a
particular statutory requirement is considered jurisdictional, neither party can
waive or forfeit arguments about whether that requirement has been met.'"
Even when the defendant fails to argue in the trial court that a jurisdictional
requirement was not satisfied, the courts can still consider that argument on
appeal. By contrast, when the requirement is nonjurisdictional, litigants who
fail to raise the issue in the court of first impression lose their opportunity to
raise that challenge on appeal." Second, when a statutory element is treated as
jurisdictional, courts have "an independent obligation" to determine whether
that element has been satisfied.'" Even when the defendant concedes that the
requirement has been met, the court is required to independently evaluate
whether this is true. Courts are under no such obligation when the element is
not considered jurisdictional.
Given the consequences of jurisdictional treatment for litigants and courts,
it is unsurprising that jurisdictional treatment sometimes can affect case
outcomes. Consider, for example, the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Marcum
v. Salazar.4 The plaintiffs challenged the government's decision to deny their
applications for permits to import "elephant trophies" from a hunting trip. The
government did not contest the existence of final agency action in district
court, but it decided to do so on appeal.'s The D.C. Circuit explained that the
government was right: the plaintiffs' claim ordinarily would not have been
actionable "for want of final agency action."'6 But as the court acknowledged,
and as explained in Part II, final agency action is not a jurisdictional
requirement in federal-question cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.' For
that reason, the government had "forfeited the objection" by not raising it in
district court.'8 Though the court recognized that the government's position
io. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.
ii. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 513-14.
14. 694 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
is. Id. at 125-27.
16. Id. at 128.
17. Id.; see infra Section II.A.
18. Marcum, 694 F. 3d at 128.
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had merit, treating finality as nonjurisdictional meant that the court could not
decide the case in the government's favor on finality grounds. If the
requirement had instead been jurisdictional, the court would have been
required to dispose of the case based on the lack of finality."
Of course, jurisdictional treatment is not always outcome determinative. As
long as the government contests the existence of final agency action in the
court of first impression, the jurisdictional label likely will not affect case
outcomes; the court can dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.2 o It is only
where the government fails to raise the issue that the jurisdictional label
matters. In these cases, erroneously treating final agency action as jurisdictional
means that, even where the government technically has waived or forfeited the
finality argument, the court can address finality sua sponte and dismiss the
case on finality grounds without ever reaching the merits. This gives the
government a free pass, and it deprives plaintiffs of the protection of
traditional waiver and forfeiture rules, making a successful lawsuit against the
government less likely. For that reason, erroneous jurisdictional treatment tilts
the playing field in the government's favor, threatening to skew the
relationship between the executive branch and citizens adversely affected by
government policy.
II. FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND JURISDICTION
Despite the Court's efforts to fashion a "readily administrable bright line"
narrowing the scope of the jurisdictional label,"' lower federal courts continue
to treat the final agency action requirement as jurisdictional, even absent clear
statutory authorization. As with any clear statement rule, reasonable jurists
often disagree about whether a statute speaks clearly. For that reason, faulty
jurisdictional treatment is sometimes simply the result of lower courts relying
on a plausible but ultimately incorrect interpretation of a jurisdictional statute.
But on other occasions, the lower courts diverge much more dramatically from
the Court's clear statement rule. In this latter class of cases, lower courts ignore
the text of the jurisdictional statute altogether, applying the jurisdictional label
as a common-law mechanism for managing rising caseloads and shielding the
executive branch from judicial review early on in the agency's process.
ig. The government won the case on other grounds, but it is easy to imagine a scenario in
which the government's failure to contest finality would have been fatal to its case.
20. Cf Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 744 F.3 d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) ("Of course, the question of whether such a rule is jurisdictional matters only in
those cases where the agency has waived or forfeited reliance on the rule, which is to say not
often.").
21. Arbaughv.Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (20o6).
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A. jurisdictional Treatment Through Faulty Statutory Interpretation
The courts of appeals are divided over whether to treat final agency action
as jurisdictional when an administrative law case is first brought in district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal-question statute. Some federal
circuits treat the requirement as jurisdictional in these circumstances,' while
others do not. 3 The Fifth Circuit's 2014 decision in Belle Co. v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers illustrates the intuitive appeal of jurisdictional
treatment. In Belle, the Fifth Circuit relied on the language of the APA, noting
that section 704 of the statute "authorizes judicial review only of 'final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court."' From that
seemingly obvious statutory language, the court concluded that "[i]f there is
no final agency action, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction."6
Despite its surface-level appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit's position is
likely incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation. The D.C. Circuit's 20o6
decision in Trudeau v. FTC illustrates why final agency action is actually
nonjurisdictional in federal-question cases. 7 The Trudeau court emphasized
the Supreme Court's decision in Califano v. Sanders, which held that the APA is
not itself a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.8 As the Supreme Court has
explained, this means that the "judicial review provisions of the APA" - where
the final agency action requirement appears -"are not jurisdictional." 9 With
Califano in mind, the D.C. Circuit then applied Arbaugh's, clear statement
rule."o "Because Congress did not clearly state that the final agency action
requirement of APA § 704 is jurisdictional,"3 ' the final agency action
22. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, 772 F.3 d 1183, 1189 (ioth Cir. 2014); Belle
Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 761 F-3d 383, 387-88 (sth Cir. 2014); Fairbanks N. Star
Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591 (9 th Cir. 2008); Home Builders
Ass'n of Greater Chi. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 335 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat'l
Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
23. See Jama v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490, 494 n.4 (6th Cir. 2014); Iowa League of
Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3 d 844, 863 n.12 (8th Cir. 2013); Chehazeh v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 666
F. 3d 118, 125 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012); Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 33 (1st Cir. 2007);
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
24. Belle Co., 761 F.3d at 387-88.
25. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)).
26. Id. at 388.
27. 456 F.3d at 184.
28. Id. at 183 (citing Califano v. Sanders, 43o U.S. 99, 107 (1977)).
zg. Air Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n-3 (1991).
30. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. soo, 515-16 (2006).
31. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 184 n.7.
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requirement could not deprive the court of jurisdiction." This conclusion was
underscored by the fact that nothing in the federal-question statute -the actual
jurisdictional statute in the case- can be construed to require finality."3
The D.C. Circuit's reasoning suggests that a number of circuits have
ignored Califano when evaluating the jurisdictional status of the APA's finality
requirement in federal-question cases. In fact, upon recognizing this omission,
at least three circuits that had previously treated final agency action as
jurisdictional in at least some federal-question cases - the Second, Fourth, and
Federal Circuits - have recently questioned the appropriateness of treating
finality as jurisdictional under such circumstances.M But even as some courts
begin to recognize the error in their interpretation of the APA's final agency
action requirement, jurisdictional treatment in federal-question cases remains
the prevailing view in several of the federal courts of appeals. 5 In light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Califano, this is a view undergirded by a faulty
interpretation of the APA.
B. Jurisdictional Treatment Through Judge-Made Common Law
Even when lower courts adopt a second-best interpretation of a
jurisdictional statute, they are at least following the Court's statute-focused
approach to distinguishing jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional rules. But the
lower courts do not always follow that approach. Sometimes, they ignore the
statutory text altogether.
Consider how courts treat final agency action in direct-review cases. In
these cases, litigants bring suit directly in the court of appeals under one of
roughly one thousand direct-review statutes that allow litigants to bypass
district courts. 6 In many direct-review statutes, jurisdictional treatment of
final agency action makes sense, as Congress clearly indicates that finality
should be jurisdictional. For example, Congress has given the courts of appeals
direct-review jurisdiction to hear cases challenging "all final orders of the
Federal Communications Commission" and "allfinal orders of the Secretary of
Agriculture." 7 These statutes specifically indicate that the courts of appeals
32. Id. at 183-84.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
34. Automated Merch. Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 782 F-3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Sharkey v.
Quarantillo, 541 F. 3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 20o8); Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States,
516 F.3d 225, 231-32 (4 th Cir. 2008).
3s. See cases cited supra note 22.
36. See Joseph W. Mead & Nicholas A. Fromherz, Choosing a Court To Review the Executive, 67
ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 15 (2015).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
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only have direct-review jurisdiction over "final orders." In other words, finality
is a prerequisite to jurisdiction.
While many direct-review statutes clearly indicate that finality is
jurisdictional, not all do. For example, the direct-review provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) specifies that "a petition for
review of action of the [EPA] Administrator in promulgating any regulation[]
or requirement. .. may be filed only" in the D.C. Circuit. 8 The judicial review
provision never mentions finality, nor does it provide any kind of clear signal -
at least not the type of clear signal found in other direct-review statutes -that
finality is a prerequisite to exercising jurisdiction. Other jurisdiction-conferring
statutes, such as those relating to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
Federal Aviation Administration decisions, also do not mention finality in their
judicial review provisions. 9
Even though these direct-review statutes do not mention finality, several
courts of appeals have indicated that the final agency action requirement
should be considered jurisdictional under these statutes.4 o These decisions do
not explain why the statutory text compels jurisdictional treatment of the
finality requirement. In fact, some of these decisions have explicitly
acknowledged the disconnect between their holdings and the statutory text.4
Why do courts impose a jurisdictional finality requirement without
statutory authorization? In turning away from the statutory text, courts have
offered two prudential justifications. First, some courts contend that
jurisdictional finality prevents judges from prematurely intruding into the
agency decision-making process. As one court explained, by denying courts the
ability to hear cases until the agency has made a final decision, a jurisdictional
finality requirement "ensure[s] there will be no interference with the
administrative process." 3 Second, some courts argue that making finality
jurisdictional prevents courts from "squander[ing] judicial resources" while
litigants still have the "opportunity to convince the agency to change its
38. 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (2012).
39. See 16 U.S.C. 5 8251(b) (2012); 49 U.S.C. 5 4611o(a) (2012).
40. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Molycorp,
Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Cal. Dep't of Water Res. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n (FERC), 341 F.3d 906, 909 ( 9 th Cir. 2003) (citing Steamboaters v.
FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1387-88 (9 th Cir. 1985)).
41. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp., 363 F. 3d at448; Cal. Dep't of WaterRes., 341 F. 3d at 909.
42. See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Water Res., 341 F.3d at 909; Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 628
F.2d 235, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 538
F,2d 966, 969 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. Cal. Dep't of Water Res., 341 F.3d at 909 (citing Steamboaters, 759 F.2d at 1387-88).
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mind."" Applying the jurisdictional label makes it less likely that courts will
have to engage in piecemeal review prior to the completion of the agency's
process. On this view, jurisdictional treatment allows courts to avoid
addressing the merits in litigation that would otherwise unnecessarily burden
their dockets.4 s
While much of the most forceful prudential reasoning predates Arbaugh,
these prudential arguments still continue to influence the courts even after the
Court's recent efforts to narrow the use of the jurisdictional label. Some
courts have even explicitly acknowledged that they issue jurisdictional
dismissals for want of final agency action "for the sake of judicial economy."47
These justifications are untethered from the statutory text and are in tension
with the Court's approach to identifying jurisdictional rules. They are a
product of exactly the kind of judge-made common law the Court has sought
to eliminate in this area.
Ill. RECALIBRATING THE DOCTRINE IN THE LOWER COURTS
The foregoing discussion suggests that the doctrine in the lower courts is in
need of recalibration. Many courts incorrectly treat finality as jurisdictional in
federal-question cases because they have misinterpreted the underlying
jurisdictional statute.8 In these cases, the lower courts must acknowledge that
the APA is not a jurisdictional statute.4 9 Where a court takes jurisdiction
pursuant to the federal-question statute, final agency action should not be
considered jurisdictional. Instead, it is a nonjurisdictional element of an APA
cause of action.
44. Reliable Automatic Sprin1der Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 324 F. 3d 726, 732
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 8oi F.2d 4 3 0, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
45. Note, however, that this prudential justification is in tension with the Supreme Court's
recent assertion that "[j]urisdictional rules may also result in the waste of judicial
resources." Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). The Court
has suggested that jurisdictional requirements can be wasteful because they subvert our
legal system's "rules requiring that certain matters be raised at particular times." Id.
46. See, e.g., Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3 d 1084, 1092 ( 9 th Cir. 2014)(noting that the scope of the court's jurisdiction should not be construed "to 'afford[]
opportunity for constant delays in the course of the administrative proceeding,' such as
would arise if courts could review every interim agency order or action" (quoting Fed.
Power Comm'n v. Metro. Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 383 (1938))); TC Ravenswood, LLC v.
FERC, 565 F. App'x 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (relying on Papago Tribal Util. Auth., 628 F.2d at
239).
47. ExxonMobil Gas & Power Mktg. Co. v. FERC, 442 F. App'x 563, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
48. See supra Section II.A.
49. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977) ("[T]he APA does not afford an implied
grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action.").
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In other cases, the lower courts base their jurisdictional determinations on
prudential considerations entirely external to the jurisdictional statutes adopted
by Congress. This kind of judge-made common law is out of step with the
Arbaugh clear statement rule, which requires courts to train their focus
primarily on the text of the jurisdictional statute.so To bring their doctrine into
line with the Court's precedent, the lower courts should pay attention first and
foremost to the text of the jurisdictional statute. In many direct-review cases,
this will still mean that finality should be jurisdictional. But in some cases, such
as those brought under RCRA's direct-review provision, the courts should
treat finality as nonjurisdictional because the direct-review statute does not
speak with the requisite level of clarity to warrant jurisdictional treatment.s"
Nonetheless, any attempt to bring long-term stability to the jurisdictional
doctrine on final agency action - particularly in direct-review cases - may not
ultimately succeed without Congress's help. The lower courts' prudential
justifications for viewing finality as jurisdictional hint at some of the
institutional incentives that might push the lower courts toward jurisdictional
treatment. As some scholars have explained, lower federal courts face a "crisis
of volume."' Rising caseloads have stretched judicial resources thin.' By
treating statutory requirements as jurisdictional, the lower federal courts may
be able to constrict the scope of their own jurisdiction and thereby reduce the
number of cases they must address on the merits. Indeed, this logic seems to
undergird the prudential arguments that courts sometimes use to justify
jurisdictional treatment.s4
5o. Note that Article III's prudential ripeness doctrines do not give courts license to make a
statutory finality requirement jurisdictional without congressional approval. Article III
ripeness and the statutory final agency action requirement entail separate legal inquiries,
and the Court has recognized this distinction. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-50 (1967) (applying a different analysis for ripeness than for final agency action
under the APA). Accordingly, while in some cases it may be legitimate for courts to look at
prudential considerations in evaluating whether a case is ripe for review under Article III,
those prudential considerations should have no bearing on the jurisdictional status of the
statutory final agency action requirement.
5i. Additionally, while a long history of the Supreme Court interpreting "similar provisions in
many years past" as jurisdictional "is relevant to whether a statute ranks a requirement as
jurisdictional," Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010), there is no such
history in the case of RCRA.
52. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1112 (2011).
53. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 3-8 (2013).
54. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 42-47.
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Without congressional action to address the institutional incentives that
drive jurisdictional treatment, some lower courts might continue to ignore the
Arbaugh clear statement rule and treat finality as jurisdictional, even without
clear statutory authorization. Scholars have offered a laundry list of possible
solutions to reduce the burdens facing the federal courts, and I do not intend to
recapitulate that list here." The point is simply that Congress might be able to
bring more stability to the doctrine by alleviating some of the existing
pressures on the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
While this Comment has focused specifically on the final agency action
requirement, the tension between the Supreme Court's doctrine on
jurisdictional rules and the lower courts' implementation of that doctrine is one
that extends beyond final agency action. This tension is perhaps best captured
by the fact that the Court recently has granted certiorari in a surprisingly high
number of cases in which the lower courts have treated statutory requirements
as jurisdictional. 6 In many of these cases, the Court has unanimously reversed
the lower courts.
This Comment sheds light on why this tension has emerged. It is hardly
surprising that matters of statutory interpretation sometimes divide the courts.
More surprising, however, is that lower courts sometimes ignore the Court's
clear statement rule altogether, choosing instead to impose jurisdictional
treatment as a common-law mechanism for managing their caseloads and
narrowing the scope of judicial review. Indeed, this kind of prudential
reasoning also appears in other lower-court cases outside the final agency
action context.s Resolving the tension between the lower courts and the
Supreme Court thus may require more than just a concerted effort by the lower
55. For some examples of works recommending possible solutions, see RIcHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by
Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974); and Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of
Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315
(2011).
56. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'1 Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013); Henderson ex rel.
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010); Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. 154.
57. See cases cited supra note 56.
58. Compare, e.g., Marley v. United States, 567 F.3 d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2oo9) (treating a
statute of limitations provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act as jurisdictional for
prudential reasons), with Keller v. United States, No. 11-02345, 2012 WL 2929504, at *3 (D.
Ariz. July 18, 2012) (recognizing the tension between the Ninth Circuit's approach in Marley
v. United States and the Supreme Court's doctrine).
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courts to adhere to the Court's doctrine. It may also require congressional
action to address the underlying institutional incentives that push the lower
courts toward jurisdictional treatment.
SUNDEEP IYER
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2016. I am grateful to Drew Days, Dahlia Mignouna, Lianna
Reagan, Katie Wynbrandt, and the participants in the Yale Law Journal Contemporary
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John M. Walker, Jr., BA., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Megan A. Wulff, M.P.H., J.D.
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